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RELIEF FROM TORT LIABILITY THROUGH
REORGANIZATION
"I think this is a unique circumstance but not an abuse of the
bankruptcy system."'
"I am offended by the perversion of the bankruptcy laws."2
Creditors and lenders are not always surprised when one of their
debtors files for bankruptcy. Most lenders and creditors regularly esti-
mate the amount of uncollectible accounts in their financial reports.
Revenue lost because of debtor bankruptcy is, in a sense, a cost of doing
business. Such costs can be limited through careful determination of
creditworthiness or by passing on such costs in the form of higher inter-
est charges. The injured party in a tort suit, however, has no similar
protection. There is no way for the tort litigant to minimize the chance
that the defendant he sues will file for bankruptcy.'
The precarious position of the injured plaintiff has become well
publicized' in In re Johns-Manville Corp." In that case, the largest
producer of asbestos in America, Manville Corporation, filed for reor-
ganization under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code." Manville had a
$1.1 billion net worth and total assets exceeding $2.2 billion at the time
of filing;7 the company was not overextended, nor was it suffering from
lagging sales.' Simply, Manville was suffering from thousands of tort
actions.9
Filing for bankruptcy relief because of massive tort liability is a
new phenomenon. A survey of business bankruptcies in six federal
I N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at D4, col. 3 (statement of Ronald On-, Los Ange-
les bankruptcy attorney, concerning Manville Corporation petition for reorganization).
2 Id. at Al, col. 6 (statement of Thomas Henderson, Pittsburgh asbestos plaintiffs
attorney, concerning Manville Corporation petition for reorganization).
3 See Note, Tort Claims Under the Present and Proposed Bankruptcy Acts, 11 U.
MICH. J. L. REF. 417, 417, 435 (1978).
4 See, e.g., Lewin, The Legal Issues in Manville's Move, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27,
1982, at D4, col. 1.
' Nos. 82-B-11,656 to 82-B-11,676 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 26, 1982).
6 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (Supp. V 1981).
7 See STOCKHOLDERS & CREDITORS NEWS SERv. CONCERNING JOHNS-
MANVILLE CORP., ET AL. 1 (Andrews Publ., Inc.) (Sept. 15, 1982) [hereinafter cited
as NEWS SERV.].
8 Id. at 3, 8.
9 Id. at 1. Manville stated that as of June 30, 1982, 11,000 suits brought by
15,500 individuals were pending against the company. New suits were being filed at a
rate of 425 per month. One projection estimates that Manville could face a total of
52,000 suits and between $2 and $5 billion in liability before the whole situation has
run its course. Id. at 3.
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court districts conducted in the late sixties by the Brookings Institution
did not even list tort liability as one of the possible causes of business
bankruptcy.1" Further, as will be discussed later, Congress did not fore-
see tort liability as a potential cause of bankruptcy when it rewrote the
bankruptcy statute in 1978.11
The novelty of tort liability as a cause of bankruptcy, however,
should definitely not suggest that it will remain an infrequent occur-
rence. The American environment today is a technologically sophisti-
cated one in which humans have contact with substances whose effects
are not yet documented. The toxicity of many substances may go unno-
ticed for decades because of the state of medical knowledge or the long
latency period of a particular disease. Asbestos, for example, has been
in use since at least the fifth century B.C., 2 but the first report on an
asbestos-related disease was not made until 1906."s Since that year, the
evidence against asbestos has slowly but steadily mounted.1" The expe-
rience with asbestos is not unique: the miscarriage preventative DES is
now known to cause cancer in daughters of women who took the drug.
and similar claims have been advanced by "DES sons"; the herbicide
Agent Orange is also now regarded as carcinogenic, and the toxic
materials in industrial waste dumps may prove to be yet another source
of deadly disease. 5 The potential number of suits in such cases is stag-
gering, 6 and it is reasonable to predict that there will be many more
tort defendants seeking bankruptcy in the years to come.17
10 D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEMS, PROCESS, REFORM 111
(1971) (Table 6-2). The study cited "business below expectations" and "internal man-
agement problems" as the most common underlying causes of bankruptcy. Id.
" See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
1 Mehaffy, Asbestos-Related Lung Disease, 16 FORUM 341, 342 (1980).
1' Id. at 343.
14 See id. at 343-45. Today, inhalation of asbestos fibers has been shown to cause
a variety of disabling or fatal lung diseases, including asbestosis, mesothelioma, and
bronchogenic carcinoma. Id. Asbestosis is a form of pulmonary fibrosis, an abnormal
formation of scar tissue following an inflammation in the connective tissue framework
of the lungs. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 538 (14th ed. 1981).
Mesothelioma is a malignant tumor in the mesothelia surface lining in the lung.
Mehaffy, supra note 12, at 344. Bronchogenic carcinoma is the type of lung cancer
associated with cigarette smoking. Id. at 343.
There are other diseases, such as cancer of the gastrointestinal tract, which may be
related to asbestos exposure. "We have progressed from asbestosis to mesothelioma to
bronchogenic carcinoma, and it would not be unrealistic to predict that further progres-
sion will take place." Id. at 350.
15 See Toxic Time Bombs, 67 A.B.A. J. 139, 140 (1981).
18 More than 1,000 suits have been filed concerning DES and there could be as
many as 50,000 plaintiffs in cases involving Agent Orange. Id. at 139-40. Manville
Corporation itself may eventually face 52,000 asbestos-related tort actions. See supra
note 9.
1 Manville is the second corporation to file for relief because of asbestos litiga-
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The occurrence of bankruptcy due to massive tort liability raises
several questions. First, there is the positive question whether the bank-
ruptcy law can be used to help a company whose major creditors are
tort claimants. Second, there is the normative question whether the
bankruptcy laws should provide such relief. Part I of this Comment
discusses the historical treatment of tort claims in bankruptcy proceed-
ings, and shows that although most major reforms of the bankruptcy
laws with regard to tort claims have been aimed at improving debtor
relief, the treatment of tort claimants has indirectly improved. Part II
establishes that the bankruptcy laws can be used as a shield against
burdensome tort litigation, and that safeguards exist within the Code to
ensure that tort claims are treated equitably and that only debtor-de-
fendants actually in need of bankruptcy relief obtain it. Part III con-
cludes that providing financially distressed tortfeasors with reorganiza-
tion relief is consistent with the goals of both bankruptcy and tort law,
that those underlying policies are best served by allowing the bank-
ruptcy court to consider the claims of future plaintiffs, and that such
consideration is not barred by the due process clause.
I. HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF TORT CLAIMS IN
BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
Throughout the course of American bankruptcy law, tort claims
have gradually received more comprehensive treatment from Congress.
The former Bankruptcy Act, enacted in 1898,18 embodied the theory
that bankruptcy was a relief to be limited to traders. 9 In England
bankruptcy was traditionally concerned only with contractual debt.20
Unless reduced to judgments,2" tort claims were not considered in liqui-
tion. The first asbestos manufacturer to file was UNR Industries, Inc. See In re UNR
Indus., Inc., Nos. 82-B-9841 to 82-B-9851 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. filed July 29, 1982). The
third firm to file for chapter 11 relief was Amatex Corporation. See In re Amatex
Corp., No. 82-05,220k (Bankr. E.D. Pa. filed Nov. 1, 1982). Because Manville is the
largest of the three, the Manville case has engendered the most vociferous and wide-
ranging reactions, as the remarks quoted at the beginning of this Comment demon-
strate. Thus, most of the illustrative references in this Comment will be to the Manville
proceeding.
Is Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. §§ 1-1200 (1976) (repealed 1979)).
19 See Glenn, Basic Considerations in Tort Claims in Bankruptcy and Reorgani-
zation, 18 N.Y.U. L.Q. REv. 367, 368-69 (1941).
2o Id.
21 When reduced to a judgment, a tort claim was regarded, in "ancient fiction," as
a "contract of record." Glenn, supra note 19, at 369. Similarly, quasi-contractual tort
claims, such as unjust enrichment, were given consideration in bankruptcy proceedings.
Id.; Note, supra note 3, at 419-20.
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dation proceedings because they were not "provable. 22 Any unprov-
able tort claim thus could not be discharged by the court.2" The knowl-
edge that the defendant would not be freed in bankruptcy proceedings
from liability in a pending tort action was small consolation to the tort
plaintiff, however, since the eventual result was likely to be an uncol-
lectible judgment.
The reorganization sections2' of the 1898 Act similarly ignored
tort claims. The focus of those sections of the Act was to provide a
"trader" with a means of relief from overwhelming contractual debts. 5
Thus, a plaintiff in a pending tort action could continue to press his
claim in full, any outcome of reorganization notwithstanding.26 Reor-
ganization provided the debtor with no relief from tort liability.27
The Chandler Act, 8 enacted in 1938, was a major reform of the
Bankruptcy Act which, among other things, provided more comprehen-
sive relief to debtors in reorganizations. The Chandler Act gave the
court the authority to consider tort claims in reorganizations, regardless
of their provability.2 ' Tort plaintiffs gained such consideration, how-
ever, out of congressional concern for the corporation seeking bank-
ruptcy relief, and not out of concern for the plight of tort claimants.
Reorganization, as opposed to liquidation, 0 was designed "to facilitate
22 See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 63, 30 Stat. at 562-63 (codified as amended at
11 U.S.C. § 103 (1976) (repealed 1979)).
ss See id. § 95, as added Apr. 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-260, 90 Stat. 315, 323
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 415 (1976) (repealed 1979)).
s Id. §§ 101-276, 301-399 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1976)
(repealed 1979)).
2s See Glenn, supra note 19, at 367.
" Only claims considered by the court in the reorganization proceeding could be
discharged. See supra note 23.
"t One commentator at the time argued that reorganization would fail, at least in
the case of railroads, unless the statute protected the interests of tort claimants. Swaine,
Federal Legislation for Corporate Reorganization; An Affirmative View, 19 A.B.A. J.
698 (1933).
" Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 11 U.S.C. (1976) (repealed 1979)).
29 The Act achieved this modification by including claims of "whatever character.
whether or not such claims are provable" in the statutory definition of "claim." Id.
see. 106, 52 Stat. at 883 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1976) (repealed
1979)).
so The basic difference between reorganization and liquidation is illustrated by
the fact that the Chandler Act did not modify the definition of "claim" in the liquida-
tion chapter to include tort actions, as it did for reorganizations. Almost as soon as the
Chandler Act was enacted at least one commentator found the lack of consideration of
tort claims-in liquidation to be an inexcusable inconsistency given the changes in the
reorganization process which allowed tort claims to be considered. See Glenn, supra
note 19, at 372-74.
There is one exception to the remarks in the text which should be noted. A 1934
amendment provided for consideration of negligence claims in liquidation cases if the
suit was pending when the bankruptcy petition was filed. Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424,
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rehabilitation" of distressed corporations by a "rearrangement of their
obligations and shareholders' interests." ' To succeed, reorganization
had to provide "discharge of all demands of whatsoever sort, executory
and contingent, presently due or to mature in the future." 2
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 constituted a major overhaul
of the bankruptcy laws" and continued to permit consideration of
pending tort claims in reorganization proceedings." Congressional at-
tention focused primarily upon modernizing the reorganization process
to make it "a quicker, more efficient procedure."35 Concern centered on
the fact that the former reorganization chapters "reflect[ed] a certain
lack of sophistication in handling the myriad problems of modern cor-
porate finance."36
The House report on the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 de-
scribes the nature of the disease for which reorganization was devel-
oped as a cure.
The premise of a business reorganization is that assets that
are used for production in the industry for which they were
designed are more valuable than those same assets sold for
scrap. Often, the return on assets that a business can pro-
duce is inadequate to compensate those who have invested in
the business. Cash flow problems may develop, and require
creditors of the business, both trade creditors and long-term
lenders, to wait for payment of their claims. If the business
can extend or reduce its debts, it often can be returned to a
viable state."
sec. 4(a), 48 Stat. 911, 923-24 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 103(a)(7) (1976)
(repealed 1979)). Congress adopted the measure primarily in response to the growing
number of suits precipitated by automobile accidents. See J. MAcLACHLAN, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 138 (1956). The failure of Congress to include
other types of tort claims, however, further indicates the absence of concern for the
general predicament of all tort plaintiffs in bankruptcy proceedings.
S City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 433, 438 (1937).
32 Id. at 438-39. See also 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 9.05 (14th ed. 1978).
33 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (Supp. V 1981) (this is the chapter 11 reorganization
section). Although much of the new statute which pertains to reorganizations is con-
tained in chapter 11, many other sections of the statute have general applicability to
any bankruptcy action. See id. § 103. For background on the changes the new statute
has made and their effects on reorganization, see Downey, Ferriell & Pfeiffer, The
Proposed Bankruptcy Reorganization Provisions: A Comparison of the Current Law
withChapter 11 of H.R. 8200 and S. 2266, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 567 (1978);
King, Chapter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 107 (1979).
*' See infra notes 40-64 and accompanying text.
3 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AI. NEWS 5963, 5966.
36 Id. at 221, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6181.
37 Id. at 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6179.
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Thus, reorganization remains oriented toward assisting a company
whose poor business performance has placed it in a precarious financial
position. Consideration of tort claims remains only incidental to the
task of restoring viability to the financially distressed firm. Comprehen-
sive relief requires comprehensive consideration of claims against the
debtor, and out of that need, tort claims are allowed a role.
Throughout the congressional deliberations concerning the new
bankruptcy code, however, there seems to have been no contemplation
of the possibility of bankruptcy caused primarily by tort liability. The
issue of whether reorganization relief is nevertheless available to such a
debtor is the subject of the following section.
II. AVAILABILITY OF CHAPTER 11 RELIEF
TO MASS TORTFEASORS
A. The Nature of Chapter 11 Relief
Before considering whether a firm distressed by tort liability can
receive chapter 11 protection, it is helpful to discuss briefly what chap-
ter 11 entails and how it handles tort claims. As noted before, the
reorganizations chapter is a way to help a financially distressed busi-
ness return to a viable state. 8 The goal is "to restructure a business's
finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its employees with
jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders." 9 The
rationale for providing an alternative to liquidation is that reorganiza-
tion "is more economically efficient . . . because it preserves jobs and
assets."40 The purpose of the reorganization proceeding is the formula-
tion and acceptance of a plan for restructuring 41 which establishes the
amounts creditors will be paid, the form of payment, the amount of
interest to be retained by shareholders, and the form in which the busi-
ness will continue.4" It is the implementation of such a plan that the
bankruptcy petitioner seeks from the court.4
" See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
39 See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 35, at 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6179.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 221, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6180.
4S Id. Some commentators have noted that under chapter 11 the question is not
whether the business will survive but who will own it. Bulow, Jackson & Mnookin,
Winners and Losers in the Manville Bankruptcy, Wall St. J., Nov. 4, 1982, at 30, col.
3. The authors make this observation by noting that claims against the debtor are often
satisfied by payment of securities in the reorganized entity.
43 It should be noted that the petitioner is not always the debtor. Section 303 of
the Act allows three creditors with noncontingent claims to petition the court to force
reorganization upon a reluctant debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (Supp. V 1981). Such
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The proceeding begins with the filing of the petition which consti-
tutes an automatic order for relief."" The petition automatically insti-
tutes a stay of most legal actions which could be pending or initiated
against the debtor.45 As for tort-related claims, cases pending against
the debtor are postponed, new actions cannot be instituted, judgments
cannot be recovered, and those seeking subrogation or contribution are
forced to wait because of the stay.4e The stay itself immediately im-
proves the financial state of the debtor-current obligations are post-
poned, freeing liquid assets for continuation of the business.'
The next step is the establishment of a committee of creditors and,
often, a stockholder committee.48 The court is also able to appoint,
upon request, additional committees should the need arise.' 9 In cases
involving a mass tortfeasor, the court might authorize a committee com-
posed of tort plaintiffs.50 By bringing together the major creditors and
proceedings are referred to as involuntary, while those initiated by the debtor are
known as voluntary reorganizations.
Id. § 301.
45 Id. § 362(a). The stay does not operate to postpone the following: a criminal
proceeding against the debtor; the collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from
property that is not part of the debtor's estate; an action to perfect an interest in prop-
erty if the rights of the trustee operating the debtor's business are subject to the perfec-
tion; an action by the government to enforce a regulation or a nonmonetary judgment
obtained to enforce a regulation; a setoff of a mutual debt based on speculative invest-
ments (e.g., futures or forward commodity contracts, leverage transactions, options,
warrants, etc.); an action by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to fore-
dose a mortgage or deed of trust held by the Secretary or formerly insured under the
National Housing Act involving property of at least five living units; and the issuance
of a notice of tax deficiency by the government to the debtor. Id. § 362(b).
46 Id. § 362(a)(1), (2), (6), (7). The stay, of course, does not last forever. The stay
of any action against property is lifted if the property in question is disposed of or is
otherwise no longer part of the debtor's estate. Id. § 362(c)(1).. For the most part,
however, the stay continues until the case is closed, dismissed, or until a discharge is
granted or denied, whichever is earliest. Id. § 362(c)(2).
Any party in interest may request that the stay be lifted or modified, id. § 362(d),
and the court may grant such relief for cause. Sufficient "cause" in this situation may
be limited to interests of secured creditors in the property of the debtor. See, e.g., 124
CONG. REc. 32,395-96 (1978) (statements of Rep. Edwards) and 124 CONG. RE
33,995 (1978) (statements of Sen. DeConcini).
47 For example, after posting a second quarter loss of $26,158,000, see NEws
SEmv., supra note 7, at 3, Manville Corp. rebounded to a third quarter profit of ap-
proximately $24,300,000. Manville filed for bankruptcy on Aug. 26, 1982, about one
month into the third quarter. Manville common stock also rebounded after the slump
precipitated by the bankruptcy filing. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1982, at D10, ed. 3.
Most of the turnaround in earnings may have been due to lower operating expenses
because of the stay.
" 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
49 Id. § 1102(a)(2).
50 Such a committee was formed in the Manville case. In re Johns-Manville
Corp., Nos. 82-B-11,656 to 82-B-11,676 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 1982) (order di-
recting the United States Trustee to appoint a committee of asbestos-related litigants
and/or creditors), reprinted in ASBESTOS LIGATION REP. (Andrews Publ., Inc.)
1983]
1234 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 131:1227
claimholders the committees provide a structure for consideration of the
debtor's situation and development of a reorganization plan.51 The
debtor has the exclusive right to propose a plan within 120 days from
the filing of the petition.5" If each class of claims and equity interests
has accepted the plan, 53 the court will generally approve the plan.4
With regard to classes of claims, the two major categories are typi-
cally secured and unsecured claims;55 the statute makes no differentia-
tion between tort claims and other unsecured claims.5" Further classifi-
cation of claims in a plan is subject to a simple rule-the claims in any
class must be substantially similar to each other.5 Thus, for cases in
which a mass tortfeasor is the debtor, the reorganization plan might
classify claims as follows: secured claims, debentures, trade credit obli-
gations, and tort claims. The classification is important to the extent
that the classification of a claim will determine how it will be treated
by the proposed reorganization plan. 8 All claims within a class must
be treated equally.59
The power of the reorganization proceeding flows from one partic-
ular provision: the so-called "cramdown" provision.6" Even if a particu-
lar class dissents to and is impaired under the plan, the court may still
approve the plan if particular requirements are met regarding the pro-
posed payment to the dissenting class.6" Briefly, the court may approve
a plan regardless of whether a particular class votes to reject the plan if
the claims in the dissenting class will be paid in full. 2 Alternatively,
5,756 (Oct. 22, 1982). The courts should also appoint a representative to represent the
interests of future claimants. See infra notes 105-39 and accompanying text.
"1 See 11 U.S.C. § 1103 (Supp. V 1981).
52 Id. § 1121(b). The court may "for cause" extend the 120-day period. Id. §
1121(d). If the debtor fails to submit a plan within the allotted time, then a creditor
may file a plan. Id. § 1121(c).
53 Id. § 1126.
Id. § 1129(a)(7), (8).
Although the statute does not specifically define "unsecured claim," "claim" is
defined to include any right to payment whether secured or unsecured, fixed or contin-
gent. Id. § 101(4)(A). Further, a creditor who has a claim secured by a lien on prop-
erty of the debtor has a secured claim to the extent of the value of the property which
secures the claim. If the collateral's value is less than the amount of the claim, the
balance of the claim is unsecured. Id. § 506(a). Thus, it seems that all claims which
are not secured are unsecured, whether fixed or contingent, whether based on tort or
contract law.
" See supra note 55.
57 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (Supp. V 1981).
58 See id. § 1123(a).
59 Id. § 1123(a)(4). A claim may be treated differently from the rest of its class
only if the claimholder consents. Id.
o See id. § 1129(b).
61 Id. § 1129(b)(1).
s' See id. § 1129(a)(8). Basically, a claim is "unimpaired" if the plan provides
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the court may still approve the plan even if the dissenting class will not
be paid in full if the plan "does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair
and equitable" with respect to such dissenting classes.63 An additional
prerequisite to court approval is that every holder of a claim must have
voted to approve the plan or, if any claimholder rejects the plan, he
must receive under the plan an amount equal to what he would receive
if the debtor were liquidated."
Thus, the provisions of chapter 11 seek to ensure that the interests
of tort claimants, like all claimholders, are adequately protected. Rep-
resentatives are appointed on behalf of those claimants to approve or
reject the proposed reorganization plan. If those representatives vote
against the plan, that plan can only be approved by the court if it treats
those claimants equitably and does not discriminate against their
interests.
With this brief description of the mechanics of reorganization, we
can now consider whether tortfeasors can seek chapter 11 relief.
B. Use of Chapter 11 Relief
Chapter 11 was not originally designed to relieve a debtor suffer-
ing from massive tort liability, 5 and plaintiffs have claimed that such
relief should not be available to the asbestos defendants.66 Nonetheless,
that the claim will be paid in full. Id. § 1124.
63 Id. § 1129(b)(1). Although the requirements that the plan must "not discrimi-
nate unfairly" and must be "fair and equitable" may sound simple enough, they really
are quite involved. The unfair discrimination provision basically means that equal
classes should be treated equally. Because the seniority of one class over another is
relative and not absolute, the mechanics of creating a plan that does not discriminate
unfairly can become quite complex. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 35, at 416-17,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6372-73.
The fair and equitable rule is similarly complex. One commentator has described
the requirement as follows:
A plan is fair and equitable as to a class of impaired unsecured claims
(and therefore the class' acceptance of the plan is not necessary) if the
class receives, under the plan, the present value of the full amount of their
allowed claims; or, in the alternative, the class receives whatever reorgani-
zation values are available after satisfaction of senior classes-and no jun-
ior interest receives any reorganization values.
Trost, Business Reorganizations Under Chapter 11 of the New Bankruptcy Code, 34
Bus. LAW. 1309, 1335 (1979) (footnotes omitted)(emphasis in original).
" 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A) (Supp. V 1981). The process can become very com-
plex if many claimholders are dissatisfied with the plan. For the court to approve a
plan over the objections of a particular "impaired" class, the court has to calculate the
value of the debtor's estate so that it can determine whether the dissenting classes will
receive an equitable portion of their claims. Such an evaluation can prolong the pro-
ceeding by several months.
' See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
6 See N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1982, at D1, col. 4.
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the statute permits corporate defendants to file for reorganization.
6 7
Once the petition is filed, chapter 11 relief may be denied if the court
abstains from taking jurisdiction, if the court dismisses the action under
section 1112, or if the court determines that the petition was not filed
in "good faith." None of these three causes for dismissal, however,
should require denial of chapter 11 relief solely because the debtor is a
mass tortfeasor.
Courts are free to abstain from taking jurisdiction in any bank-
ruptcy case whenever "the interests of creditors and the debtor woiuld
be better served by such dismissal.""es The legislative history suggests
that the abstention provision is designed to prevent the federal bank-
ruptcy proceeding from duplicating a more feasible out-of-court ar-
rangement e 9 One court has stated that abstention is proper only under
such circumstances.70 Thus, the mere fact that a debtor has filed for
chapter 11 relief primarily because of excessive tort liability is insuffi-
cient reason for a court to abstain from taking jurisdiction. 1
Section 1112 of the bankruptcy code permits a court to deny chap-
67 With voluntary petitions, the statute requires only that the petition be filed by
"an entity that may be a debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. V 1981). Any "person" that
is not a stockholder or a commodity broker is considered such an entity. Id. § 109(d).
Further, the statute defines "person" to include a corporation. Id. § 101(30). Thus, any
incorporated manufacturing concern, such as the asbestos defendants, may file for chap-
ter 11 relief.
I d. § 305(a)(1).
69 The legislative history states:
The court may dismiss ... , for example, if an arrangement is being
worked out by creditors and the debtor out of court, there is no prejudice
to the rights of creditors in that arrangement, and an involuntary case has
been commenced by a few recalcitrant creditors to provide a basis for fu-
ture threats to extract full payment. The less expensive out-of-court
workout may better serve the interests in the case.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 35, at 325, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 6281. See, e.g., In re Nina Merchandise Corp., 5 Bankr. 743 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Luftek, Inc., 6 Bankr. 539 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980).
70 In re WPAS, Inc., 6 Bankr. 44 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980). But cf. In re Fast
Food Properties, Ltd., 5 Bankr. 539 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1980) (suggesting abstention is
proper whenever a case imposes upon the jurisdiction of the court).
71 A situation may arise in which congressional action would create a mandatory
tort victim compensation system, replacing individual tort suits. The proposed Occupa-
tional Health Hazards Compensation Act of 1982, H.R. 5735, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982), for example, would provide for the compensation of individuals who are dis-
abled as a result of occupational exposure to asbestos or uranium ore.
While it may be argued that in a given situation, such as the asbestos litigation,
legislative solutions may be optimal from society's standpoint, the mere consideration by
Congress of any such compensation system should not automatically cause a bank-
ruptcy court to abstain. Bills do not always become laws, and the problems of corporate
mass tortfeasors and potentially uncompensated future claimants are all too real. See
infra text accompanying notes 124-28 and 137-39.
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ter 11 relief73 to a petitioner "for cause."'7' The statute lists nine possi-
ble situations which would constitute cause, including reasonable likeli-
hood that the debtor cannot be rehabilitated and difficulties in
effectuating a plan.7 ' None of the listed situations75 require dismissal
solely because the debtor is a tort defendant; rather, the court must
consider the facts of each case and determine what is "in the best inter-
est of creditors and the estate."
'7 6
Finally, a court may dismiss a petition for reorganization if it de-
termines that the petition was not filed in good faith.77 Requisite good
faith has been deemed lacking in cases in which reorganization was
impossible,78 in which the debtor was unwilling to effectuate a reorgan-
72 The court may either convert the case to a chapter 7 liquidation case or dismiss
the case altogether. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (Supp. V 1981). Within certain limits, a
debtor may also convert a case to a chapter 7 case. See id. § 1112(a).
73 Id. § 1112(b).
74 Those situations are:
(1) continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and absence of a
reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation;
(2) inability to effectuate a plan;
(3) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors;
(4) failure to propose a plan under section 1121 of this title within
- any time fixed by the court;
(5) denial of confirmation of every proposed plan and denial of addi-
tional time for filing another plan or a modification of a plan;
(6) revocation of an order of confirmation under section 1144 of this
title, and denial of confirmation of another plan or a modified plan under
section 1129 of this title;
(7) inability to effectuate substantial consummation of a confirmed
plan;
(8) material default by the debtor with respect to a confirmed plan;
and
(9) termination of a plan by reason of the occurrence of a condition
specified in the plan.
Id. Many of these causes reult in a conversion of the action into chapter 7 proceedings.
7' It should be noted that the list in note 74 is not exhaustive. Section 1112(b)
cites the reasons for cause as "including" those nine situations, and "including" is to be
construed as not limiting. Id. § 102(3). The legislative history notes that the "court will
be able to consider other factors as they arise, and to use its equitable powers to reach
an appropriate result in individual cases." H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 35, at 406,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6362.
76 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (Supp. V 1981).
77 The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 required that petitions for reorganization be filed
in good faith. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 141, 52 Stat. 840, 887 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1976) (repealed 1979)). Courts interpreting the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978 have stated that although the Code no longer explicitly
requires good faith in filing petitions for reorganization, good faith is nevertheless "an
implicit prerequisite" to relief. E.g., In re Victory Const. Co., Inc., 9 Bankr. 549, 558
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981).
7a See, e.g., In re Western Tool & Mfg. Co., 142 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1944), rev'd
on other grounds, 324 U.S. 100 (1945).
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ization,79 or in which the petition was filed for purposes other than
reorganization, such as for the preservation of assets.80 Good faith has
never been found lacking solely because the bulk of a petitioner's credi-
tors were tort plaintiffs."' Plaintiffs in the Manville proceeding, how-
ever, have claimed that the asbestos manufacturer did not file for reor-
ganization in good faith, that the firm is seeking only to escape liability
to the asbestos victims.
8 2
A determination that a mass tortfeasor has filed for reorganization
solely to escape liability will require a finding that the firm is able to
satisfy its tort obligations; a mere showing that the debtor-petitioner is
currently solvent is insufficient to dismiss for lack of good faith." In
cases involving latent injury, where the disease may not manifest itself
for over thirty years, ' an accurate determination of a debtor's liability
may be extremely difficult. Not only is most of the debtor's liability
contingent and unliquidated in such cases, but it is also difficult even to
determine the total number of claims against the company seeking re-
lief.8 5 This estimation of the debtor's liability is a factual determination
to be made by the court, 8 and once made, only then can the court
79 See, e.g., Leatherhide Indus., Inc. v. Lieberman, 268 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959).
80 See, e.g., In re Nancant, Inc., 8 Bankr. 1005 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981) (petition
filed solely to have tax liability determined); In re Fast Food Properties, Ltd., 5 Bankr.
539 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1980) (petition filed solely to frustrate a power of sale provision
under a deed of trust); In re G-2 Realty Trust, 6 Bankr. 549 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980)
(petitioner changed the form of its entity solely to be eligible under chapter 11 in order
to prevent foreclosure).
01 In one case, the court found a tort-besieged debtor to have met the requirement
of good faith. See In re Alton Tel. Printing Co., 14 Bankr. 238 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1981).
In Alton the debtor was a newspaper company which had lost a $9.2 million libel suit.
The newspaper was unable to post a supersedeas bond (required in order to appeal the
libel judgment) without filing under chapter 11 to obtain a stay.
81 See Application for Dismissal of Cases or Abstention, In re Johns-Manville
Corp., Nos. 82-B-11,656 to 82-B-11,676 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 26, 1982); see
supra note 66.
" The previous Code did require that the petitioner be insolvent. Bankruptcy Act
of 1898 § 130 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 530 (1976) (repealed 1979)) (re-
quirements for a former chapter X reorganization); id. § 323 (codified as amended at
11 U.S.C. § 723 (1976) (repealed 1979)) (requirements for a former chapter XI ar-
rangement). Why the insolvency requirement was dropped is unclear. The legislative
history of the new statute makes no reference to the old "insolvency" requirement.
" See Statutes of Limitation Eased to Permit Latent Disease Claims, 11 ENVTL.
L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,082 (Mar. 4, 1981).
" For example, in the Manville case, there were 11,000 tort suits against the
company when it filed for relief. See supra note 9. Moreover, projections of the total
number of asbestos tort actions against Manville suggest that as many as 50,000 suits
will eventually be filed. Id.
86 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (Supp. V 1981). One commentator has suggested that
the bankruptcy court should estimate Manville's aggregate asbestos-related liability,
and leave the estimation of individual claims to state courts and other federal courts.
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determine if the corporate defendant filed without good faith.
Thus, the bankruptcy laws permit corporate tortfeasors to file for
reorganization. If, however, the court determines that the debtor does
not actually require such relief (because, for example, the debtor over-
estimated its liability), or that the petitioner is merely attempting to
limit its tort liability, the court is free to dismiss the petition for lack of
good faith. Concluding that reorganization relief is available to corpo-
rate defendants raises the normative question of whether such relief
should be available.
III. THE APPROPRIATENESS OF BANKRUPTCY RELIEF FOR MASS
TORTFEASORS
A. Bankruptcy Relief for Mass Tortfeasors Furthers
the Goals of Bankruptcy and Tort Law
It has been shown thus far that the statutory provisions and equi-
table doctrines of bankruptcy law permit financially distressed
tortfeasors to file for and receive bankruptcy relief. Granting such re-
lief, particularly chapter 11 reorganization relief, advances the goals of
both bankruptcy and tort law.
The bankruptcy laws serve two functions. The oldest form of
bankruptcy relief, liquidation, was "established to resolve in a fair and
orderly manner the conflicts in interest that arise among creditors of a
debtor who cannot pay his debts"; 7 it prevents creditors from racing to
the courthouse, each seeking to satisfy his claims against the debtor
before the depletion of the debtor's assets. Reorganization incorporates
this goal and adds another policy consideration: since a business's assets
usually have more value when they form a going concern than if sold
for scrap, it is generally more economically efficient to rehabilitate than
to liquidate a debtor. 8
It is much more difficult to give a concise statement of the goals of
tort law.8 Although many purposes and rationales for tort relief can be
Note, The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11 Proceed-
ings, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1128-41 (1983). It is not clear that this is necessarily an
equitable result. The author notes that "[i]n the 3500 suits that Manville disposed of
before its chapter 11 filing, its total defense costs were nearly equal to the total cost of
the judgments rendered against it." Id. at 1129 n.44. Forcing Manville to continue
defending suits in various courts would place a heavy burden on the company, and
would necessarily deplete the assets available to the tort claimants. Thus, if the bank-
ruptcy court were to appoint masters to estimate the value of individual claims, for
example, both the claimants and debtor would be benefited.
57 D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 10, at 9.
" See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
89 Part of the problem is that no satisfactory definition of "tort" exists. Prosser
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proffered,90 it is sufficient to state that at a minimum tort law is
designed both to compensate victims and to deter at least some future
injurious conduct.
Permitting mass tortfeasors to receive bankruptcy relief is consis-
tent with these goals. Bankruptcy proceedings permit the court to con-
sider all the tort claims against the debtor: those that have been reduced
to judgments, those pending, and those which have yet to be filed.' 1
This consideration of all the claims together permits an orderly treat-
ment of all the plaintiffs, and prevents plaintiffs who receive prior
judgments from obtaining significantly higher awards than those who
receive later judgments.92 At the same time, this collective treatment
prevents any plaintiffs from receiving total compensation for their inju-
ries from the debtor. The tort law goal of compensation is better served,
however, by allowing all the injured an equitable share of the debtor-
defendant's assets.9" Further, although there may be due process
problems occasioned by the bankruptcy court's consideration and esti-
mation of the compensation of a victim who has yet to file a tort claim
against the debtor-defendant, these difficulties are not insurmountable,
as will be discussed below."
begins his famous hornbook by pointing out the peculiar lack of coherence which exists
in the law of torts:
Included under the head of torts are a miscellaneous group of civil
wrongs, ranging from simple, direct interferences with the person, such as
assault, battery, and false imprisonment, or with property, as in the case
of trespass or conversion, up through various forms of negligence, to dis-
turbances of intangible interests, such as those in good reputation, or com-
mercial or social advantage. These wrongs have little in common and ap-
pear at first glance to be entirely unrelated to one another, except perhaps
by the accident of historical development; and it is not easy to discover any
general principle upon which they may all be based, unless it is the obvi-
ous one that injuries are to be compensated, and antisocial behavior is to
be discouraged.
W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 2-3 (4th ed. 1971).
90 See generally id. at 16-23.
91 See infra text accompanying notes 105-14.
92 "Because bankruptcy eschews a first-come, first-served payment system, the ex-
isting claimants stand to lose; the future claimants stand to gain." Bulow, Jackson &
Mnookin, supra note 42, at col. 5.
93 A recent study concluded that if all asbestos victims are allowed to continue
receiving full compensation for their injuries, as the earliest plaintiffs have, the result
will be the bankruptcy of the corporate defendants and their insurance companies.
Thus, not only would future asbestos claimants be without compensation, but policy-
holders besides product liability insurance holders would lose their coverage and be
exposed to uninsured losses. See P. MacAvoy, The Economic Consequences of Asbes-
tos-Related Disease 85-86 (Jan. 1982) (Series C-Research Program in Government
Business Relations, Yale School of Organization and Management, Working Paper No.
27) (copy on file at University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
" See infra notes 130-39 and accompanying text.
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It may be argued that the tort law goal of preventing future injuri-
ous conduct will be frustrated if mass tortfeasors are permitted bank-
ruptcy relief because the debtor will not have to compensate the victims
fully for their injuries;95 some of the debtor's liability will be shifted to
its creditors. This argument is unpersuasive, however, for several rea-
sons. First, the cost of even partially compensating tens of thousands of
victims would be staggering.96 There is little likelihood of the tortfeasor
paying for all its tortious conduct even without reorganization. Second,
even though the debtor may be relieved from fully compensating each
victim, bankruptcy proceedings have consequences for the debtor suffi-
ciently drastic to deter future injurious conduct. If the debtor is liqui-
dated, the corporation is dissolved and the shareholders will lose their
investment. 97 Even if the debtor is able to survive reorganization, there
is a strong possibility that ownership of the corporation will be in new
hands. 8 These severe consequences should provide a sufficient deter-
rent effect. Also, to argue that deterrent value is lost when the debtor is
able to shift some liability to its creditors is to ignore the realities of
corporate cost shifting. Most often the costs of liability do not come
totally from the firm's profits, but are passed on to customers in the
form of higher product prices. 99 Making trade creditors or institutional
lenders bear part of the cost of liability is but another form of distribut-
ing these costs.' 00 It is possible that those creditors will bring pressure
95 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. The probability is that many cases
will arise in which a mass tortfeasor simply does not have enough assets to compensate
its victims. See supra note 16. While the policy behind chapter 11 suggests that a
reorganization plan should include a payment schedule that leaves the debtor with suf-
ficient assets to attempt to continue as a going concern, see supra text accompanying
note 37, the fund provided for tort claimants in that plan must be large enough to
enable each victim to receive an amount that bears some reasonable relationship to the
actual damages incurred. Otherwise, the argument that the bankruptcy system offers
the most equitable method of dealing with present and future plaintiffs loses much of
its force. How much is enough-but not too much-is, of course, the essential question.
One commentator suggests a sum including an estimation of the cost of insurance suffi-
cient to cover all those significantly more likely to sustain future injury than members
of the general public. See Comment, Procedures for Estimating Contingent or Unliqui-
dated Claims in Bankruptcy, 35 STAN. L. REv. 153, 172 (1982).
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
In liquidation, the claims of all creditors are satisfied before the claims of equi-
tyholders. See 11 U.S.C. § 726 (Supp. V 1981).
BR See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
Indeed, this ability to pass on the cost of liability is one of the reasons for the
rise of liability without fault, a policy which allows more frequent recovery by tort
victims. See W. PROSSER, supra note 89, at 22.
100 In general, the passing on of such costs would probably result in higher inter-
est rate charges as lenders attempt to pass on the added cost of losses due to tortfeasor
reorganization. In turn, borrowers who must pay the resulting higher rates would be
likely to pass on the increased cost to their customers which, in effect, is an outcome
equivalent to that resulting from the average tort liabilty. Moreover, borrowers who
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on their debtor (the potential tortfeasor) to take care to avoid large tort
liabilities.
Finally, although permitting financially distressed tortfeasors some
form of bankruptcy relief will not violate the purposes behind the
bankruptcy and tort laws, it should be noted that those purposes will be
better advanced through the use of reorganization rather than liquida-
tion. First, if the bankruptcy courts determine that the interests of fu-
ture claimants cannot be considered in bankruptcy proceedings, 1 suc-
cessful reorganization will ensure that a defendant exists when those
claims do become justiciable. Second, reorganization may make more
assets available for compensating victims. Creditors can agree to delay
demands upon the debtor, and the plan could shift losses to trade credi-
tors who might otherwise have been paid off in full.102 As some com-
mentators have argued, reorganization allows the collectivization of the
tort claims which promotes summary disposition of the claims and saves
litigation costs.1 08 Finally, as noted above, 04 reorganization in general
is more economically efficient than liquidation for it preserves the
debtor as a going concern.
B. Considering the Future Claims in the Reorganization Plan
1. Considering Future Claims is Permitted by the Statute
The debtor-defendants in the asbestos litigation have argued that a
successful reorganization of their companies can be effected only if the
reorganization plan considers the claims of the victims whose asbestos-
related injuries have yet to surface." 5 Although such treatment of fu-
ture claimants raises novel legal issues, consideration of those claims in
the reorganization plan is permitted by the statute and serves the twin
goals of compensating the claimants and rehabilitating the debtor.
For a claim against a debtor to be discharged through reorganiza-
tion, proof of that claim must be filed with and allowed by the court."'
run a higher risk of massive tort liability would probably have to pay the highest rates.
Thus, it is likely that by passing on such extra costs to customers, the prices of products
that carry a high risk of injury will be more representative of the true cost of such
products.
101 See infra notes 105-39 and accompanying text.
102 See Bulow, Jackson & Mnookin, supra note 42.
103 Id., at col. 4.
'o See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
105 "This isn't some Alice-in-Wonderland theoretical game we're dealing with...
We're talking about money. If we don't get those unknown claims defined and al-
lowed, it won't be there." Wall St. J., Mar. 16, 1983, § 2, at 33, col. 5 (statement of
Malcolm Gaynor, attorney for asbestos debtor-defendant UNR Industries, Inc.).
106 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3) (Supp. V 1981).
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The debtor is required to file with the court a list of its creditors and
their claims. 107 All listed claims are deemed filed with and allowed by
the court,108 except those which are disputed, unliquidated, or contin-
gent.1" 9 Thus, the claims of successful plaintiffs which have been re-
duced to judgments are fixed, liquidated, and thereby deemed filed and
allowed.
Less clear is the statute's treatment of contingent and unliquidated
claims. The statute provides that the confirmation of a reorganization
plan "discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the date of
such confirmation." 10 "Debt" is defined as "liability on a claim," '
and "claim" includes a "right to payment, whether or not such right is
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, ma-
tured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or
unsecured." 1 2 The legislative history states that "[b]y this broadest
possible definition [of 'claim'] ...the bill contemplates that all legal
obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will be
able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case. It permits the broadest
possible relief in the bankruptcy court."1 The statute also provides
that contingent and unliquidated claims may be allowed by the court
through an estimation of those claims.114 It appears, therefore, that
through the use of the estimation provision the statute permits the
bankruptcy court to discharge the claims of future plaintiffs.
Despite this broad language of the statute and legislative history,
the first court to consider the rights of future claimants in the reorgani-
zation of a financially distressed tortfeasor has held that the claims of
future plaintiffs can not be discharged through reorganization. District
Judge William Hart denied the application of chapter 11 debtor-defen-
dant UNR Industries, Inc. for the appointment of a legal representative
for unknown future asbestos claimants. 1 5 Judge Hart decided that fu-
ture claimants are not encompassed by the Bankruptcy Code which de-
fines a creditor as a person "who has a claim against the debtor that
107 Id. § 521(1).
108 Id. § 502(a).
1. Id. § 1111(a).
110 Id. § 1141(d)(1)(A).
"I Id. § 101(11).
112 Id. § 101(4)(A).
113 H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 35, at 309, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 6266 (emphasis added).
114 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (Supp. V 1981). See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
"" In re UNR Indus., Inc., Nos. 82-B-9841 to 82-B-9851 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar.
25, 1983) (order denying debtor's "Application for the Appointment of a Legal Repre-
sentative for Unknown Putative Asbestos-Related Claimants").
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arose at the time of or before an order for relief."11  Since asbestos
plaintiffs do not have a cognizable claim against the debtor under state
law until the plaintiffs know or should know about their injury, by
definition future plaintiffs can not currently have such a claim.1 1 7 Be-
cause future plaintiffs have no claim under state law, Judge Hart held
they also have no claim recognized by the bankruptcy law and no inter-
ests which would require the appointment of legal representation.1 1
The judge narrowly interpreted a contingent claim as "one that
arises out of the prior contractual relationship of the claimant and
debtor," ' 9 and added that the "legislative history does not support the
contention that the term 'contingent' is intended to encompass a com-
mon law tort action which might arise in the future. 1 20 In any case,
the Code's reference to the estimation of a contingent claim did not
alter the basic definition of a claim. Thus Judge Hart concluded that
solutions to the problems of the future claimants must come from Con-
gress, because "[tihere is simply no authority in the statute or Constitu-
tion for this Court to grant the debtors the relief they seek."12
Judge Hart's opinion is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, its
undue emphasis on the Code definition of creditor ignores the argument
that a future plaintiff's "right to payment" actually arose at the time of
tortious conduct: exposure to the hazard.1 22 Second, the judge's narrow
view of contingent claims seems at odds with the statutory language,
and relevant legislative history, permitting a court to consider all legal
claims, no matter how remote, unliquidated, or contingent.
1 28
The decision reached by Judge Hart is also disturbing because it
is inimical to the purposes of reorganization relief. As noted above, 24
116 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) (Supp. V 1981).
117 In re UNR Indus., Inc., Nos. 82-B-9841 to 82-B-9851, slip op. at 9 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 1983).
118 Id. at 9-12. Judge Hart also noted that it would be impossible for one legal
representative to represent adequately the claims of all future claimants, id. at 14, and
that the problems of notifying those whom the representative's action would bind would
be insurmountable, id. at 15. See infra notes 130-39 and accompanying text.
119 Id. at 9-10 (emphasis in original). But see infra note 123.
120 Id. at 11 n.4.
121 Id. at 18.
122 See Note, supra note 86, at 1131 n.52; cf. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N.
Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (insurance policies covering exposure of workers
to asbestos are triggered by exposure as well as by manifestation of disease), cert. de-
nied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982). But see Fusco v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 643 F.2d
1181 (5th Cir. 1981).
123 See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text. A leading treatise defines con-
tingent claims as debts that, either as to their existence or as to their amount, depend
upon some future event uncertain either as to its occurrence altogether or as to the time
of the occurrence. 3A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 63.30, at 1912.1 (14th ed. 1977).
1" See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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reorganization is designed to aid and restore financially insecure busi-
nesses; it is more economically efficient to reorganize than to liquidate.
The asbestos defendants have argued that unless they are allowed to
consider the tens of thousands of future claims, they will be forced to
liquidate because trade creditors and lending institutions will refuse to
do business with a company facing such tremendous liability. 125 At
least one asbestos defendant has been liquidated, 120 and unless some
relief is granted, more will follow. 12 7 For the bankruptcy courts to re-
fuse to consider the future claims and to abdicate their role in fashion-
ing relief, a course Judge Hart suggests,"' is an inadequate reply;129 it
fails to recognize that the bankruptcy courts have the equitable powers
to consider the future claims.
2. Due Process Does Not Bar Consideration of Future Claims
Since inclusion of the claims of future plaintiffs in a reorganiza-
tion plan through the appointment of a legal representative may reduce
or eliminate the value of those claims, due process considerations are
clearly implicated by such a plan. 3 In In re UNR, Judge Hart found
that the problems of notifying those whom the legal representative
would be able to bind were insurmountable,3 ' and thus the plan of
reorganization would be subject to constant attacks over the years on
due process grounds.1 2
Such a view, however, is less than imaginative and not mandated
by the Constitution. Supreme Court precedent exists for the proposition
that adjudications concerning a limited fund may proceed despite the
absence of beneficiaries whose identity and whereabouts are unknown,
provided that a guardian for their interests is appointed. In Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,"'3 a guardian for the interests of
13 See Wall St. J., Mar. 16, 1983, § 2, at 33, col. 4.
126 Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc. sold off all of its operating assets as a going con-
cern for cash and is paying off asbestos claims until the cash is gone. See Bulow, Jack-
son & Mnookin, supra note 42.
1"1 See P. MacAvoy, supra note 93, at 85-86.
'I' See In re UNR Indus., Inc., Nos. 82-B-9841 to 82-B-9851, slip op. at 18
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 1983). For competing views on the form that the congres-
sional action should take, see Miller, Don't Let Industry Shirk Its Duty, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 5, 1982, § 3, at 2, col. 3; Hart, Let Government Bear its Share, id. at col. 5; see
also supra note 71.
2tSee supra notes 71 & 126.
130 See Comment, supra note 95, at 161.
181 In re UNR Indus., Inc., Nos. 82-B-9841 to 82-B-9851, slip op. at 15 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 1983).
132 Id. at 17.
13 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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unascertained beneficiaries was appointed to confirm or object, at the
annual accounting, to the procedures followed by the trustee in manag-
ing a trust fund. The guardian's confirmation of the trustee's proce-
dures would serve to "cut off" the rights of the unascertained benefi-
ciaries "to have the trustee answer for negligent or illegal impairments
of their interests."' ' The Court went on to hold that this right was
sufficiently protected by notice through publication to the unknown
beneficiaries, since there was already a guardian appointed to protect
their interests.3 5 Although in the asbestos cases the persons who even-
tually will become claimants do not now know they will become claim-
ants, they do know that they are members of a clearly defined class of
potential claimants, namely workers who were exposed to asbestos.
Reasonable notice to those potential claimants should satisfy, the re-
quirements of Mullane. Thus, it would seem constitutipnally permissi-
ble to bind future asbestos claimants now and prevent them from pur-
suing claims against the debtor later, provided that a representative is
appointed to protect their interests.136
Finally, failing to consider the future claimants now can only have
disastrous consequences for those claimants later. The notice required
by due process seeks to protect the interests of future claimants; an in-
flexible application of those requirements would work the reverse.1 "
As Judge Hart acknowledged, "The Court is not unaware that in re-
fusing to approve of a procedure by which the rights of the putative
claimants would be adjudicated and cut off, the putative claimants may
wind up with judgments against corporations left with only one asset: a
corporate charter."' 38 Refusing to consider now the claims of future
victims may prevent them from ever receiving any compensation from
the debtor. Such a result, certainly detrimental to the goals of tort law,
should not be considered constitutionally mandated. As one commenta-
tor has stated, "the due-process clause has never been construed to re-
14 Id. at 313.
185 Id. at 317.
186 This argument based on Mullane has been advanced by asbestos debtor-defen-
dant Amatex Corporation in its efforts to have the court appoint a guardian ad liten to
represent its future claimants. See Brief of Amatex Corporation, Debtor in Possession,
Objecting to the Relevance of Mr. Greitzer's Proffered Testimony, at 6-11, In re
Amatex Corp., No. 82-05,220K (Bankr. E.D. Pa. filed Nov. 1, 1982). In that brief,
Amatex argued against the admission of testimony that in most jurisdictions a cause of
action for tort does not arise until an injury becomes manifest.
137 "It has been said so often by this Court and others as not to require citation of
authority that due process is flexible and calls for such procedural safeguards as the
particular situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1971).
I"8 See In re UNR Indus., Inc., Nos. 82-B-9841 to 82-B-9851, slip op. at 18
(Mar. 25, 1983).
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quire the impossible. This may be the best the courts can do."""9
IV. CONCLUSION
Although not designed to relieve tortfeasors from the financial
stress of massive liability, the bankruptcy reorganization laws neverthe-
less provide the flexibility necessary to achieve an equitable solution
which preserves the interests of both the claimants and the debtor.
First, if the court determines that the tortfeasor is inaccurately estimat-
ing its potential liability and is merely using reorganization to escape
liability, the court can dismiss the debtor's petition for lack of' good
faith. Second, the appointment of a tort plaintiffs' committee ensures
that the claimants' rights Will be adequately protected. That committee
has the power to approve or reject a proposed reorganization plan; if
the court nevertheless approves a rejected plan, the statute requires'that
the plan not discriminate unfairly among the claimants and that it be
fair and equitable. Finally, the statutory language and legislative his-
tory of the bankruptcy code indicate that the court can appoint a guard-
ian to represent the interests of future claimants. Such a step is consti-
tutionally permissible and would serve the dual goals of ensuring that
those claimants will receive at least some compensation for their inju-
ries, and that the debtor corporation can successfully reorganize and
return a viable company.
139 See Wall St. J., March 16, 1983, §2, at 33, col. 5 (statement of Professor Vern
Countryman, Harvard Law School). In concluding that the special circumstances of
the future claimants may require a less restrictive view of due process, it should be
noted that some traditional rules of due process are more relaxed in bankruptcy courts.
Cf. In re DCA Development Corp., 489 F.2d 43, 46 (1st Cir. 1973) (individual's inter-
est in notice and hearing must be balanced against the overall interest in efficient, final
resolutions of claims; latter interest is particularly important in bankruptcy context)
(applying former bankruptcy act). For example, tort litigants generally have no right to
a jury trial in the bankruptcy court; this would apply to the asbestos plaintiffs pursuing
claims against debtor-defendants. See Note, supra note 86, at 1140-41.
-19831

